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SPENCER V. RAYBURN

CITY OF SPENCER v. RAYBURN: OKLAHOMA
PROPERTY VOTER RESTRICTION IN ELECTION TO
APPROVE MUNICIPAL BONDS DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In City of Spencer v. Rayburn,' the Oklahoma Supreme
Court considered the validity of Art. 10, § 27, of the Oklahoma
Constitution which permits only qualified property-taxpaying citizens to vote in elections to approve the issuance of
2
municipal obligation bonds.
In an original action before the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
the City of Spencer sought a Writ of Mandamus to compel
its Mayor, layburn, to hold a special election in order to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds as authorized
by Art. 10, § 27, of the Oklahoma Constitution. The City Council had previously adopted a resolution directing its Mayor
to submit to the qualified voters for their approval municipal
1 483
2

P.2d 735 (Okla. 1971).

OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 27 provides in part:
Any incorporated city or town ... may, by a ma-

jority of the qualified property taxpaying voters
of such city or town, voting at an election to be
held for that purpose, be allowed to become indebted in a larger amount than . . . [the regular

5% constitutional debt limitation], for the purpose
of purchasing or constructing public utilities, or for
repairing the same, to be owned exclusively by
such city: Provided, that any such city or town
incurring any such indebtedness .

.

. shall provide

for the collection of an annual tax in addition to
the other taxes provided for by this Constitution,
sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness
as it fall due, and also to constitute a sinking fund,
for the payment of the principal thereof within
twenty-five years from the time of contracting the
same. (emphasis added)
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bonds in the sum of $132,000.00 for the purpose of improving
and expanding the city water system. The Mayor refused on
the basis that the resolution called for submission of the proposition to qualified voters; whereas, Art. 10, § 27 specifies submission to qualified property taxpaying voters of the City.
Consequently, the City of Spencer sought a Writ of Mandamus, challenging the validity of Art. 10, § 27, by asserting
this provision violated the "equal protection clause" of the
fourteenth amendment by disenfranchising otherwise qualified
voters who are not property taxpayers.
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court had previously
upheld the State's right to restrict to property taxpayers the
vote in elections to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds,3 the plaintiff contended that the recent U. S.
4
Supreme Court decision in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski
required the State Supreme Court to reverse its position and
declare the voter restriction in Art. 10, § 27 unconstitutional.
Therefore, a thorough examination of Phoenix is essential in
order to properly evaluate the decision rendered by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
The Phoenix case also involved the constitutionality of
state laws designed to deny otherwise qualified voters who
own no real property the right to vote in elections to approve
the issuance of general obligation bonds to be used in financing municipal improvements.5 The City of Phoenix, Arizona held an election on June 10, 1969, to authorize the issue of $60,450,000 in general obligation bonds. According to
Arizona law, ad valorem taxes were to be levied to service
8 Settle v. City of Muskogee, 462 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1969).
4 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
5 ARiz. CONST. art. 7, § 13, art. 9, § 8; ARiz. REV. STAT. A-' .
§§ 35-452 (1956), 35-455 (Supp. 1971); Law of March 9,
1943, ch. 31, § 4, [1943] Ariz. Laws 73 (amended in 1970
to reflect the Phoenix decision, now ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-523 (Supp. 1971)).
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the indebtedness, although the City was legally entitled to
use other revenues for this purpose.0 The bonds were subsequently approved in an election wherein only real property
taxpayers were permitted to vote. On August 1, 1969, Kolodziejski, a qualified voter who owned no real property, filed
suit in the United States Court for the District of Arizona
challenging the constitutionality of the restricted franchise in
Arizona bond elections and attacking the validity of the election approving the Phoenix bonds. A three-judge district court
held this exclusion of nonproperty-owning voters a violation of the Federal Constitution.7 The City of Phoenix appealed this decision to the United States Supreme Court which
affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Arizona Constitution
and statutes as applied to exclude nonproperty owners from
voting in elections to approve general obligation bonds violated the "equal protection clause" of the fourteenth amendment. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court relied
on two earlier cases, Kramer v. Union Free School District
and Cipriano v. City of Houma.9 Discussing Kramer the
Phoenix Court maintained Kramer held:
[A] State could not restrict the vote in school district elections to owners and lessees of real property
and parents of school children because the exclusion
of otherwise qualified voters was not shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling state interest.10
This announced principle, by its terms applicable to elections
of public officials, was extended to elections for the approval
of revenue bonds to finance local improvements in Cipriano
v. City of Houma. n'
6 399 U.S. at 205 n. 1.
7 313 F. Supp. 209 (D. Ariz. 1969).
8 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
9 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
10 City of Phoenix v Kolodziejsld, 399 U.S. 204, 205 (1970).
11 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
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IThe Cipriano case involved a successful challenge to the
constitutionality of Louisiana voter restrictions which allowed only property taxpayers to vote in elections called to approve municipal utility revenue bonds.12 The United States
Supreme Court in Cipriano stated that the Louisiana restriction did not meet the ".

.

. exacting standard of precision

we require of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise." 3 The Cipriano Court referred to its decision in
Kramer and declared that the constitutionality of the Louisiana voter restriction depended on "whether all those excluded [were] in fact substantially less interested or affected than
those the statute include[d]." 4 Since all customers of the
utility system pay utility bills and their rates could be "substantially affected" by the amount of revenue bond indebtedness, the Court stated:
[P]roperty owners are not alone in feeling the impact of bad utility service or high rates, or in reaping the benefits of good service and low rates.
The revenue bonds are to be paid only from the
operations of the utilities; they are not financed in
any way by property tax revenues. Property owners,
like nonproperty owners, use the utilities and pay
the rates; however, the impact of the revenue bond
issue on them is unconnected to their status as property taxpayers. 15
The Court determined in Cipriano that those excluded
by the classification were clearly as interested and affected
12

LA. REV. STAT. §§ 39:501, 39:508 (1950); § 33:4258 (Supp.

1971). These statutes authorize Louisiana municipalities to
issue revenue bonds, but only if they are approved by a
"majority in number and amount of the property taxpayers qualified to vote ...

[who voted in the bond election]."

§39:501 (1950).
13 395 U.S. at 706, quoting, Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
14 395 U.S. at 704, quoting, 395 U.S. at 632.
LA. REV. STAT.

15 395 U.S. at 705.
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as those included. And since the voting classification was
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's declared
the franchise to those voters who had
objective -limiting
a special interest in the election-the restrictions were unconstitutional because there was no compelling state interest
to be served by enforcing the restrictions. For this reason,
the Court concluded that the denial of the franchise to nonproperty owners in an election regarding revenue bonds was
an abridgement of their fourteenth amendment rights.
The issue in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski then became:
Whether the Federal Constitution requires the extension of
the "Cipriano Doctrine" regarding revenue bonds to elections involving the approval of general obligation bonds? The
City of Phoenix argued that the Cipriano rationale did not
apply and therefore did not render unconstitutional the exclusion of nonproperty owners-that the restricted voting
franchise was valid because of the compelling state interests
involved.' 6 The City based this argument on two basic premises: First, the Arizona law placed a special burden on property owners since it required the levying of property taxes
in an amount sufficient to pay the interest and principal on
general obligation bonds.17 Second, the City emphasized the
servicing distinction between revenue bonds such as were
involved in the Cipriano case and general obligation bonds
as approved by the property taxpayers in Phoenix. Revenue
bonds are serviced entirely from funds derived from both
property and nonproperty owners alike because revenue
bonds are secured by income from the operation of the particular facility financed by the bonds. In contrast, ad valorem taxes are principally used to service general obligation bonds, which are secured by the taxing power of the
municipality. Therefore, the City of Phoenix contended that
general obligation bonds act as a lien on all real property
subject to taxation by the municipality, and consequently
16 399 U.S. at 207-8.
17

See note 6 Supra.
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. State is justified in recognizing the unique inter-

ests of real property owners by allowing only property taxpayers to participate in elections to approve the issuance of
general obligation bonds."' 8
The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument
and in so doing stressed the following reasons for the conclusion that the "differences between the interests of property
owners and the interests of nonproperty owners are not sufficiently substantial to justify excluding the latter from the franchise."'19 First, all citizens of Phoenix have a substantial interest in the services which the City has to provide and thus
are substantially affected by the bond election. In addition,
the Court emphasized that giving the right to vote solely to
property owners can be justified only by some "overriding
interest of those owners that the State is entitled to recognize."20 The Court felt this test had not been met. Secondly,
although the laws of Arizona call for an ad valorem tax to
service the general obligation bonds, revenues from other
sources can be utilized for this purpose. "[lit is anticipated
with respect to the instant bonds, as has been true in the
past, that more than half of the debt service requirements
will be satisfied not from real property taxes but from revenues from other local taxes paid by nonproperty owners as
well as those who own real property."21 Therefore, all citizens
will contribute directly to the servicing of the bonds by the
payment of taxes for this purpose. Thirdly, even if the general obligation bonds were serviced entirely by property owners paying ad valorem taxes, the disenfranchisement of nonproperty owners would not be justified. The Court stated:
Property taxes may be paid initially by property
owners, but a significant part of the ultimate burden
18 399 U.S. at 208.
19 Id. at 209.
20 Id. at 209.
21 Id. at 209-10.
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of each year's tax on rental property will very likely
be borne by the tenant rather than the landlord ...
[T]he landlord will treat the property tax as a business expense and normally will be able to pass all
or a large part of this cost on to the tenants in the
form of higher rent. . . . Moreover, property taxes
on commercial property ... will be treated as a cost
of doing business and will normally be reflected in
the prices of goods and services purchased by
non22
property owners and property owners alike.
For these reasons, the Court determined that the challenged
provisions of the Arizona Constitution and statutes violated
the "equal protection clause" of the Federal Constitution. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
[A]lthough owners of real property have interests
somewhat different from the interests of nonproperty
owners in the issuance of general obligation bonds,
there is no basis for concluding that nonproperty
owners are substantially less interested in the issuance of these securities than are property owners.2
Justice Stewart, dissenting, agreed with the holding in
Cipriano because there "the State had created a wholly irrelevant voting classification." 24 However, he strongly dissented with the majority opinion because the Majority was
not concerned in Phoenix with "income producing utilities
that can pay for themselves, but with municipal improvements that must be paid for by the taxpayers." 25 Because

24

Id. at 210-11. It should be noted that how successful the
landlord will be in "passing on" the additional property
tax to the tenant depends upon how responsive the demand
for rental property is to changes in rent levels. Many other
economic factors beyond the scope of this article should be
considered in determining the validity of this argument.
See, R. Netzer, EcoNoivics OF Tm PROPERTY TAX 32-40 (1966).
399 U.S. at 212.
Id. at 216 (dissenting opinion).

25

Id. at 2174

22

2
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the indebtedness created by the general obligation bonds
operates during the lifetime of the bonds as a lien on all
taxable property, Justice Stewart argued, the exclusion of
nonproperty owners is an entirely rational public policy and
not the "invidious discrimination that the equal protection
clause condemns." 26
This writer believes the reasoning employed by Justice
Stewart is sound and strongly disagrees with the Court's extension of the "Cipriano Doctrine" to elections involving general obligation bonds. Although Arizona restricted voting on
municipal utility bond indebtedness, this exclusion of nonproperty owners was made on the basis of who was "primarily interested in or affected by" the election. The historical
idea that property ownership is directly related to voter competence is no longer accepted by the Supreme Court.-7 However, the City's argument in Phoenix was not that property
owners were better qualified to vote, but that they, as a class,
had a substantially larger interest in the election than did
those not owning real property. Although their general interest in public improvements may not be any greater, their
pecuniary interest in the bond issue is substantially greater
than that of the property taxpayers in Cipriano. The property taxpayers in Arizona are directly responsible for the
cost of the bonds through additional ad valorem taxes; whereas, the property taxpayers in Ciprianopay for revenue bonds
only as users of the public improvement at the same rate as
do nonproperty owners. The Court argued in Phoenix that
this distinction is invalid because property owners pass on
the affect of higher ad valorem taxes to lessees and consumers, and in this manner nonproperty owners *share the expense of the general obligation bonds. The question arises as
to the extent the additional ad valorem tax is "passed on"?
26 Id. at 218.
27

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668
(1966).
..
'A
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In absense of positive proof that a significant
higher property tax is passed on to the tenant
the Court failed, in this writer's opinion, to
need for extending the principles established

portion of the
and consumer,
demonstrate a
by Cipriano.

Nevertheless, Phoenix indicates that all states having provisions requiring property ownership as a basis for voter
qualification in elections to approve the issuance of general
obligation bonds are in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 29 Therefore, the central issue in the Oklahoma case,
City of Spencer v. Rayburn, was whether Phoenix rendered
inoperable Article 10, Section 27 of the Oklahoma Constitution insofar as it permits only property taxpayers to vote
in general obligation bond elections? Although the Oklahoma
Supreme Court on several previous occasions had declared
Section 27 to be within the spirit of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment,30 the court applied Phoenix
and in a unanimous decision held the voter limitation unconstitutional.
The Spencer case represents not only a significant and
complete reversal of the court's attitude,31 but brings the
It should be noted that the Court in Phoenix specifically
named 12 states besides Arizona which restrict the franchise to property taxpayers in varying degrees in general
obligation bond elections. Oklahoma was one of the states.
By inference, was the Court suggesting that these state
statutes were unconstitutional? 399 U.S. 213 n.11.
30 Settle v. City of Muskogee, 462 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1969),
Settle v. Board of Co. Comr's of Co. of Muskogee, 462
P.2d 646 (Okla. 1969).
31 This change in the Oklahoma Supreme Court's attitude
is reflected by the withdrawn opinion in Beauchamp v.
Oklahoma City, 41 OKLA. B.A.J. 2215 (Oct. 10, 1970), wherein the court refused to apply Phoenix by factually distlmguishing Section 27 from the analogous provisions of the
Arizona Constitution and statutes. Realizing either their
tremendous error in judgment, or else due to mounting
pressure from bond buyers and city officials, the court
withdrew this opinion and in another decision upheld an
20
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state constitution into harmony with the Phoenix mandate.
The constitutional question of the restricted voting francise
in Oklahoma has finally been resolved, removing the doubt
and uncertainty of bond buyers, public officials, and concerned citizens.
Charles L. Waters.

Oklahoma City bond election on the basis that Oklahoma
has no well-defined period for challenging general obligation bond elections within the meaning of the Phoenix
case. 41 OKLA. B.A.J. 2317 (1970). The question, therefore,
of the validity of the restricted franchise was left unresolved.
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